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Teaching science—a political question 
 
Those of us in science education usually have an idealistic conception of what we do. We introduce 
students to profound ideas about how the world works. Science opens up new horizons. Even when 
we make gestures toward practicality, we emphasize that developing citizen capabilities in a 
modern world should be a central goal of education. And to accomplish this, we need to make the 
best knowledge available, as agreed upon by the best of our experts. 
 
In practice, however, science education demands resources, and these resources are allocated by a 
political process in which the broadly liberal ideals of scientists and educators do not always 
command widespread agreement. Many scientific theories—most notoriously Darwinian 
evolution, but also much environmental science—challenge conservative religious and political 
beliefs. Therefore, resistance to science education is not unusual. And in the debate over science 
education, conservatives are more likely to emphasize deference to the beliefs of a community 
rather than the consensus of outside academic experts. 
 
In that case, teaching science to a mass audience, in the manner scientists would prefer it to be 
taught, must be politically justified by appealing to interests held in common by a broad cross-
section of the citizenry. This usually means a promise of direct economic benefits to individual 
students or the country at large. With theories such as evolution, however, such benefits are difficult 
to demonstrate, and therefore the publicly offered rationales for mainstream science education fail 
to convince many conservative constituencies.  
 
Evolution education faces conservative Christian opposition in the United States, and conservative 
Muslim rejection in Turkey. Populist affirmations of religious knowledge and distrust of secular 
expertise are common themes in both Protestant and Islamic varieties of creationism. And in both 
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countries, debates over science education take place against a backdrop of unchallenged 
neoliberalism. Comparing the politics of science education in Turkey and the United States, then, 
can be illuminating. After all, public debates over science and religion are also political contests, 
and nowhere is this more apparent where there are educational consequences. 
 
Popular resistance to evolution 
 
The controversy over biological evolution is the leading contemporary example of institutional and 
intellectual friction between science and religion. Monotheistic religions, particularly in their 
conservative varieties, usually affirm some form of explicit supernatural creation, or at the very 
least some kind of intelligent design manifested in the history of life forms. Biology today 
recognizes no evidence of purposeful intervention in evolution, and mindless processes such as 
natural selection are considered sufficient to explain the history of life. Therefore, evolution finds 
greater acceptance among religious liberals who downplay traditional supernatural beliefs, and 
Darwinian evolution is a centerpiece in nonbelief inspired by science (Edis 2006). Popular atheist 
arguments very often claim support from biological evolution (Dawkins 2006). 
 
In the United States, with its anomalously high religiosity compared to other technologically 
advanced countries (Norris and Inglehart 2011), opposition to evolution has been persistent, 
especially since the creationist revival of the 1960s (Numbers 2006). Creationism has very little 
presence among American educational and scientific elites; even the recent, more ecumenical and 
intellectually ambitious Intelligent Design movement has either been dismissed as a variety of 
religious creationism (Forrest and Gross 2007) or analyzed as a gross scientific failure (Young and 
Edis 2004). Nonetheless, creationism has a strong political constituency among religious 
conservatives, which constantly exerts pressure on American science education. Though the most 
ambitious initiatives to introduce creationism or Intelligent Design into public secondary schools 
have been blocked by the courts, legislative efforts favoring anti-evolutionary views are constantly 
renewed. Creationists have had some minor success at influencing state science education 
standards (Lerner 2008) and passing laws allowing for “critique of scientific theories” in education, 
with emphasis on theories considered controversial by political conservatives, such as evolution or 
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anthropogenic global warming (Rosenau 2009). In many conservative Protestant private schools, 
creationism has long been part of the curriculum. 
 
While the American variety of creationism is most notorious, opposition to evolution is also a 
global phenomenon. It is not unusual to read news of creationism among Christians in South Korea, 
Russia, or South Africa, or Orthodox Jews in Israel (Numbers 2006). Buddhists (Lopez 2008) and 
Hindus (Brown 2012) occasionally express discomfort with Darwinian evolution because it 
excludes teleology, though they show little opposition to common descent—the notion that all 
living things on Earth share a common ancestor. Even Europe has recently been a scene for 
significant creationist activity, not just in conservative Christian enclaves but among Muslim 
immigrant populations (Blancke, Hjermitslev, and Kjaergaard 2014). 
 
Both in terms of popular support and in terms of influence on public education, the most successful 
opposition to evolution appears in Muslim-majority countries (Edis 2007, Hameed 2008). The 
Middle East has a long history of rejection of Darwinian evolution, with significant effects on 
science education (Edis and BouJaoude 2013), and other predominantly Muslim regions such as 
South Asia also exhibit resistance to evolution (Riexinger 2009). 
 
One common theme in the global resistance to evolution is the well-explored intellectual tension 
between supernatural beliefs and Darwinian evolution. But it is also clear that the public debate 
over creation and evolution is often also an intensely political contest. As the American and Islamic 
examples show, public opposition to evolution often surfaces as a reaction to the imposition of 
evolution on a religiously conservative population by means of state-supported science education.  
 
Hence the debate over creation and evolution involves much more than scientific claims about the 
history of life. Both Muslim and Christian creationists state that their opposition to evolution is 
motivated by worries about morality, both because Darwinian evolution undermines the 
plausibility of traditional religious beliefs vital to communities and because sometimes evolution 
is perceived to directly support an ethos of violent struggle for existence (e.g. Morris 1974, Yahya 
2002). But these moral concerns do not stand alone; they are often expressed in the context of a 
conservative political philosophy. In turn, supporters of evolution endorse its presence in education 
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not just because they trust science, but also because that trust takes shape in a context of ideals 
about the aims of education in the modern world. 
 
Liberals and conservatives 
 
The contest between creation and evolution is global, but the politics involved is characterized by 
local variety. Nonetheless, some common threads exist. Defenders of evolution in public education 
tend toward an establishment liberal point of view that trusts expertise, affirms public enterprises 
at a national scale, and keeps science and religion institutionally well separated. Creationists are 
more often conservative populists challenging a liberal establishment in education and demanding 
a more central role for religion in public life. 
 
Focusing on the examples of Turkey and the United States will be helpful in specifying the liberal 
and conservative points of view about evolution education. Religious conservatives in the United 
States have been the driving force behind the Christian varieties of creationism and Intelligent 
Design, with considerable influence on Christian creationism in other countries. Turkey has had 
the most extensive history among Muslim countries with a degree of secularism in government, 
which in recent decades has been partly rolled back. Turks have taken a leading role in today’s 
Islamic creationism, and popular creationist materials originating in Turkey, such as those under 
the name of “Harun Yahya,” have attained international influence (Edis 2007, chapter 4; Riexinger 
2008). Hence Turkey and the United States have been proving grounds for publicly offered 
rationales for the roles of creationism and evolution in public education. 
 
First, then, a sketch of a liberal view—after all, a liberal approach has been most influential in 
shaping modern mass education, and scientists and educators typically take a secular liberal view 
about evolution education. 
 
L1. Liberals think that natural science, as determined by the properly credentialed 
experts in science, is trustworthy. Science represents our best reasoned collective effort 
to figure out how nature works. 
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L2. Liberals believe that a properly educated person should know something about science. 
Science education is in the public interest. Not only should the practical benefits of 
science and technology be accessible to everyone, but also all should be able to develop 
their capabilities of understanding how the world works. Liberal democracies depend on an 
informed electorate; citizens have to have a basic understanding of science to participate in 
many policy debates. 
 
L3. For liberals, science is a secular enterprise. It provides public knowledge independent 
of religious faith, without interfering with religious commitments concerning non-empirical 
matters such as the ultimate nature of reality. 
 
Conservatives sympathetic to creationism often see such a liberal perspective as an endorsement 
of heavy-handed state intervention in the ability of people in religious communities to live 
according to their faith. Conservatives emphasize the local convictions of communities and the 
spontaneous results of market transactions, rather than the impositions of expertise. Therefore, 
conservatives, especially conservatives who are skeptical about evolution, might favor a different 
list: 
 
C1. Conservatives trust the concrete products of technology, but are more reserved 
about abstract theoretical descriptions of nature. Science can be overly ambitious. 
 
C2. For conservatives, the role of science in education is more limited. Students are part of 
communities with organically developed ways of understanding the world, in which moral 
and spiritual ideals are interwoven with descriptions of the workings of the world. If 
students are to become productive members of their community, their education should 
instill the appropriate loyalties. Claims of scientific expertise do not trump these local 
interests. 
 
C3. Conservatives do not agree that secularism is neutral regarding religion. To the extent 
that science is secular, science is also not neutral concerning religion, and therefore can 
be legitimately treated as an aspect of a rival ideology. 
MARBURG JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2020) 6 
 
To make these sketches more concrete, a brief look at the historical context of public science 
education in the United States and Turkey will be helpful. 
 
In the United States, mass public education has roots in the middle-class evangelical Protestant 
activism of the 19th century. Protestants, who enjoyed an informal establishment of their religion 
(Sehat 2011, Eisenach 2000), were concerned to socialize students, including the children of recent 
immigrants, into what they considered a distinctly American democratic way of life. They included 
Christianity of a supposedly nonsectarian Protestant variety in public education, prompting 
Catholic resistance. Many Catholics instead relied on an alternative network of private parochial 
schools and unsuccessfully attempted to secure public funding for their institutions. 
 
As American Protestantism split between more liberal and conservative currents, and education 
became increasingly professionalized, matters of curriculum and instruction became a domain of 
expertise. Teachers, for example, had to acquire more demanding qualifications to enter their 
profession. Secular liberal philosophies of education, such as that expressed by John Dewey, 
acquired influence, particularly among more educated circles. This influence was limited, 
especially due to the way American public education is controlled not nationally, but by state and 
local authorities. For example, the famous Scopes trial of 1925 produced ridicule of conservative 
evangelical anti-intellectualism in urban and educated circles, but did not lead to significant 
improvements in the presence of evolution in science education. Nonetheless, education became a 
professionalized field with claim to special expertise, rooted in a universal—or at least national—
conception of knowledge rather than the varying interests of local communities. 
 
The Cold War led to a more explicit imposition of expertise on science education, including 
unprecedented national-scale education policies. As a response to events such as the launch of 
Sputnik in 1957, American science education was overhauled to be able to compete with the 
communists. Biologists took the opportunity to make sure evolution appeared properly in the life 
science textbooks. This imposition of expert consensus took place relatively easily. Politics in the 
post-World War II United States had come to be dominated by a “liberal consensus,” where 
conservative political thinkers were resigned to an almost permanent minority status. Liberal jurists 
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dismantled the remains of the informal Protestant establishment, technocrats administered 
Keynesian economics, and large corporate bureaucracies sought a modus vivendi with unions. 
Control of education by experts was part of this secular liberal trend.  
 
By the early 1970s, the liberal consensus was unraveling, partly because the experts left in charge 
by Cold War liberalism had made some disastrous decisions in contexts such as the Vietnam war. 
More importantly, there was a potent conservative backlash. As secondary education in the natural 
and social sciences was made to more fully reflect the views of credentialed experts, the modern 
young earth creationist revival provided a response (Numbers 2006). Opposition to evolution 
became an issue for conservative Protestant activism. 
 
Creationists pressed for laws that would allow “equal time” for creation and evolution in the 
classroom. It soon became apparent that while such laws could be passed by local legislatures, the 
courts would inevitably strike them down as a violation of the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution, which, when interpreted from a liberal perspective, provides for church-state 
separation. Still, community pressure on public schools in religiously conservative localities often 
meant inadequate coverage of evolution. Moreover, the movement toward private Christian 
academies reacting against desegregation in the American South provided a channel for a 
creationist education. Many conservative Protestants found themselves in a position similar to 
Catholics a century ago: frozen out of a public education system controlled by elites unresponsive 
to their cultural concerns, partly relying on a parallel alternative educational system, and resentful 
of the taxes they continued to pay to fund public education. 
 
The religious conservatives objecting to evolution did not think of themselves as opposing science. 
American conservatism, no less than liberalism, has usually been captivated by the “technological 
sublime” (Nye 1996); its hero figures prominently include inventor-entrepreneurs. In conservative 
religious circles science—equated with practical technological products—has usually been 
understood to support divine design and American ingenuity (Gilbert 1997). Creationism has 
drawn much of its social support from upwardly mobile people from religious backgrounds moving 
into positions where technology is critical to earning a living—there would be little motivation for 
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constructing an elaborate pseudoscience such as creationism without a strong need to harmonize 
traditional religion with a modern technological context (Eve and Harrold 1990). 
 
And yet, religious conservatives have also found themselves continually frustrated by conflicts 
with a liberal establishment. They often have some respect for the notion of expertise, since they 
value authority: American creationists are notorious for craving and flaunting doctoral degrees, 
which occasionally turn out to be fake; contempt for the experts in academia goes together with 
efforts to found alternative institutions such as Liberty University. But by and large, experts are 
liberals, and hence the enemy. A common conservative populist view is, as Texas School Board of 
Education chair Don McLeroy put it, that “Somebody’s gotta stand up to experts” (TFN 2009). 
Conservatives consider “government” a liberal instrument of interference in peoples’ lives, but also 
broaden their defense of local community values by adopting a strong ethno-religious nationalism. 
And education, for such conservative populists, is primarily an instrument for reproducing 
community ideals. 
 
The Republican Party—the more conservative of the two major political parties in the United 
States—continues to reflect such a standpoint. The Republican Party Platform of 2012 rails against 
“liberal elites [who] try to drive religious beliefs—and religious believers—out of the public 
square” (GOP Platform 2012, p.19), favors privatization of education in the name of “consumer 
choice” (p. 42), and charges that “Ideological bias is deeply entrenched within the current 
university system” (p. 43). The 2012 Platform of the Republican Party of Texas, like many state 
party platforms, is more explicit in advocating ethno-religious nationalism in order to support 
“American Identity Patriotism and Loyalty,” and states that “We believe theories such as life 
origins and environmental change should be taught as challengeable scientific theories subject to 
change as new data is produced,” using the currently popular language to avoid outright 
creationism with its associated legal difficulties (Texas GOP 2012, p. 12). This ethno-religious 
nationalist strain in American conservatism has become even more visible with the Trump 
presidency. 
 
Liberals, including most science and education professionals, have naturally defended their 
territory against conservative political advances. In the United States, this defense has started with 
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the courts, which have consistently blocked explicit creationism from public science education. In 
effect, liberals have used elite, nondemocratic judicial institutions to frustrate populist demands 
and enforce deference to the prerogatives of an expert class. Defenders of science education insist 
that science is not a democracy—the current state of science is defined by consensus within an 
expert community. 
 
Blocking anti-evolutionary views from science education, however, depends almost entirely on the 
First Amendment, not the scientific consensus. Therefore, the American liberal defense of 
evolution is legally, as well as culturally, invested in arguing that evolution is religiously neutral, 
and indeed no threat to religious faith (Scott 2004). In practice, this has meant arguing that proper 
religion is compatible with modern science: religion that defers to science about empirical matters, 
religion as understood by liberal theologians who comfortably move in academic circles. But this 
results in favoring an elite interpretation of religious tradition—referring to a class of religious 
experts who are often distant from the beliefs of ordinary religious people—in order to define 
acceptable religion. This is hardly the sort of argument that can appeal to conservative populists 
who distrust experts. 
 
The history of Turkish science education, though very different in the details, consistently 
highlights similar themes of tension between religious communities and secular experts. The label 
“liberal” is not easily transferable, because in Turkey many of those who describe themselves as 
liberal are more akin to “libertarians” or “classical liberals” in the United States. Yet in both 
countries such liberals emphasize free markets and tend to ally politically with religious 
conservatives   Nonetheless, a dichotomy between liberal and conservative views remains 
analytically helpful. 
 
Modern education in what is now Turkey began with modernization efforts in the crumbling 
Ottoman Empire. The first few Western-style schools for Muslims were oriented toward military 
training, while traditional education continued as a disorganized and religiously focused effort 
involving madrassas and small-scale local arrangements where boys would be taught to recite the 
Qur’an. 
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The successor to the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s, the Republic of Turkey, took a radical 
modernizing direction. The republicans, largely based in the military and the remains of the 
imperial bureaucracy, had enjoyed a Western education, and considered secular education to be 
key to lifting the population out of poverty and achieving a status on a par with European nations. 
They brought education under centralized state control and emphasized the unity of instruction, 
abolishing the traditional networks of religious schooling. In effect, education became the province 
of experts, where the best practices were modeled on Western Europe and the aims of education 
were determined by a Turkish nationalist ideology (Koç 2006). Science enjoyed a high reputation 
as the foundation of Western military and commercial advantages, and ideas such as biological 
evolution straightforwardly found a place in the curriculum.  
 
Reliance on state-imposed expertise extended to matters of religion. The Turkish republicans are 
often misleadingly described as strict secularists, but the centrality of Islam to the identity of the 
citizens of the new Turkish Republic was never in doubt. The republicans had their ideas about 
proper religion, which was not the traditional Islam of Sufi orders, rural piety, or the class of 
religious scholars. The true religion appropriate for Turks had no use for any such debased 
superstitions—while preserving Sunni ritual practices and core supernatural beliefs, proper religion 
was to become an agent of modernization. Therefore, the Republic attempted to bring religion and 
religious education under state control as well. Even today, religion in Turkey remains a matter of 
state, where religious functionaries are government employees.  
 
The mostly conservatively religious population of Turkey naturally resisted the imposed 
interpretation of proper religion. Versions of traditional religious structures and education 
flourished underground, even giving rise to theologically conservative, populist, but also 
modernizing currents such as the very influential Nur movement, which was initially criminalized 
by the republicans in power (Edis 2007, chapter 3). And after the first decades, the revolutionary 
fervor of the early republic subsided. Conservative administrations accepted republican structures 
of government, but also provided outlets for popular resentment with state-imposed education and 
interference with religion. Of particular importance are the Imam Hatip schools, intended for 
vocational training of religious functionaries such as imams. They soon developed into a parallel 
education system based on Sunni Islam, taking in students vastly outnumbering possible posts, and 
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even included females who are excluded from clerical positions. This parallel religious educational 
establishment enjoyed considerable grassroots support from conservative populations, deflecting 
occasional revived republican hopes to reunify education. 
 
Resentment against state-imposed ideology and claims of expertise remained a major theme of 
religious conservatism, but after a military coup in 1980, religious conservatives began to enjoy 
more direct access to state power. Post-coup Turkey exhibited increased dominance by the business 
class (Ozan 2012) and efforts to forge closer alliances with religious populists; the mid-1980s also 
witnessed the first penetration of Turkish public education by an Islamic version of creationism 
partly derived from American Protestant examples (Edis 1994). 
 
For a while, Islamist politics retained an edge of opposition to the regime, but with the formation 
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, from its Turkish initials), which has been in control 
of the Turkish government since 2002, religious populism has been fully integrated with a 
neoliberal, business-dominated political system. Creationist references are now common in 
Turkish secondary school textbooks (Yalçınoğlu 2009), and education policy is guided by ethno-
religious nationalism. 
 
Within Turkish conservatism, opposition to liberal elites is less often expressed in terms of the anti-
government rhetoric familiar from the United States. Instead, conservatives emphasize an ongoing 
conflict in Turkey between bureaucratic and military elites entrenched in the state on one hand, and 
a traditionally devout and free enterprise oriented population at large on the other. Turkish 
conservatism, then, appears as a democratic, democratizing ideology that reconciles the state with 
the population (Göle 2000). Instead of an elite commanding expertise taking a tutelary role to 
prompt a recalcitrant population to modernize, conservatives say that they trust the market or 
political structures responsive to local community interests. 
 
Even with such differences of emphasis, however, the political philosophy guiding Turkish 
conservatism has taken on an American coloration. The rise of the AKP reflects this increased 
Americanization of political Islam in Turkey. Political theorists associated with the AKP partly 
claim inspiration from a European Christian Democratic tradition, but their animating thought 
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derives largely from Anglo-American conservative political philosophy (Akdoğan 2004), 
including conservative critiques of European Enlightenment-derived conceptions of reason 
(Özipek 2011). Indeed, some recent Turkish conservative literature presents a political outlook that 
is hard to distinguish from that of the Republican Party in the United States (e.g. Akyol 2011). This 
is not merely a matter of rhetorical convenience. As Greek political scientist Christos Teazis 
observes, “the Islamist movement in Turkey was only able to strengthen and express itself as part 
of a process of democratization (Americanization). Therefore, in this process American institutions 
have been adopted and applied in every respect” (Teazis 2010, p. 188). So a convergence of 
conservative thinking about education in Turkey and the United States is not surprising. 
 
The response to conservative dominance from the Turkish equivalent of the liberal establishment 
in science and education has been ineffective. Starting in 1997, the most visible form of creationism 
in Turkey has been an internationally exported product of private enterprise, operating under the 
name of “Harun Yahya” (Edis 1999). Scientists and educators, including the Turkish Academy of 
Sciences, strongly opposed Yahya’s wave of creationism (Sayın and Kence 1999). However, they 
phrased their objections in terms of the universal standards of scientific expertise, and worse, 
presented themselves as defending the secular nature of the Turkish state. By appealing to 
politically discredited ideals such as secularism, they ensured their failure. 
 
The AKP period has further entrenched conservative disregard of scientific expertise. The Ministry 
of Education has retained creationist material in the curriculum, ignoring academicians petitioning 
for the removal of unscientific material (Kotan 2006). Furthermore, the AKP government has 
asserted more control over scientific institutions; for example, restructuring the Turkish Academy 
of Sciences to remove its independence, and preventing a cover story honoring the two hundredth 
birthday of Darwin in a popular science and technology magazine published by the Scientific and 
Technological Research Council of Turkey (Abbott 2009).  
 
Clearly, the political contexts in which the creation-evolution contest takes place are similar in 
Turkey and the United States, though there are also important differences such as the comparative 
weakness of the liberal position in Turkey. The general views summarized by L1-L3 and C1-C3 
can usefully characterize broadly liberal and conservative approaches in both countries. 
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This is not to say that every point of view can be shoehorned under a liberal or conservative 
heading, or that either camp is perfectly unified. For example, biologist Jerry Coyne challenges L3 
from a more hardline secularist position, arguing against the notion that evolution is compatible 
with religious supernatural beliefs. He considers monotheism to be a key motivation for rejection 
of evolution, and suggests that science education needs to confront this aspect of religion rather 
than reassert liberal pieties about the separate spheres of science and religion (Coyne 2012). 
However, while the liberal model of separate spheres for science and religion is intellectually 
dubious, it also remains a politically indispensable device to smooth relationships between 
scientific and religious institutions (Edis 2006). When Turkish academics publicly defend 
evolution, they usually see no alternative to taking a similar position, endorsing liberal theological 
stances and advocating separate spheres (Aydın 2007). 
 
The liberal emphasis on expertise in L1 is also not shared by all. A left-wing critic might observe 
that academic expertise often is pressed into the service of existing arrangements of power. The 
expertise of neoclassical economists, for example, is socially more consequential than that of 
natural scientists, and reflects a practice that is insensitive to empirical failure and exhibits possibly 
pseudoscientific traits (Keen 2011). Liberals have represented neoliberalism with a technocratic 
emphasis, while conservatives have stood for neoliberalism with full spectrum dominance of the 
business class. However, while a left-wing critique of expertise may be interesting, it is of doubtful 
relevance. After all, the United States and Turkey are both countries where the political left is 
practically inconsequential. 
 
Conservatives are also not necessarily united. Conservatives who set aside religion and are more 
concerned to defend markets and neoliberalism need not have any sympathy for creationism. Such 
conservatives’ interest in education policy tends to focus on efforts to privatize education and to 
break teachers unions. Indeed, currently in the United States privatization is probably a more 
important issue concerning education than the entrenched stalemate over evolution. But in practice, 
both in Turkey and in the United States, a privatization agenda strengthens the hand of creationists, 
both because of political alliances between religious and business-class conservatives, and because 
private and parallel educational systems already harbor plenty of distrust toward evolution. 
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Moreover, conservatism that does not emphasize religion has an anti-science record of its own, as 
seen in the examples of corporate-orchestrated denials of the harm of smoking and global warming 
(Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
 
Therefore, where the creation-evolution dispute is concerned, a liberal-conservative dichotomy 
summarized by L1-L3 and C1-C3 continue to frame the political context in Turkey and the United 
States. And it is hard to negotiate a compromise: too much that is important is at stake. For example, 
even when backing away from strict secularism and praising the social cohesion and moral 
grounding religion provides, a prominent liberal philosopher such as Jürgen Habermas cannot let 
go of an ideal of natural reason. He therefore grants scientific expertise a privileged position, 
arguing that “religious citizens must develop an epistemic stance toward the internal logic of 
secular knowledge and toward the institutionalized monopoly on knowledge of modern scientific 
experts” (Habermas 2008, p. 137). But it is hard to see why religious conservatives should agree. 
Trust in scientific institutions is not automatic, and even in an Islamic context, conservative distrust 
draws on sources as eclectic as postmodern critiques of scientific knowledge (Aydın 2008). 
Furthermore, given their political dominance in the United States and Turkey, conservatives might 
not be as motivated to seek a compromise. 
 
Why teach evolution? 
 
In the present political climate, liberals feel more pressure to provide a rationale for their views of 
education. Teaching everyone evolution requires a political argument that can appeal to a broad 
constituency. 
 
One possibility is to reassert the ideal of a liberal education. A liberal democracy depends on a 
well-informed citizenry practiced in the skills of critical thinking. So liberals often argue that the 
process of education must develop these capabilities of citizenship, culminating in a higher 
education centered on the liberal arts, particularly the humanities (Nussbaum 2010, Folbre 2010).  
 
In the United States, there is a steady stream of books by academics defending liberal education—
because it is embattled. These books seamlessly blend into the literature exposing the erosion of 
support for public education. Public higher education, for example, has been defunded, partly 
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because of a successful conservative assault on its implicit political ideals. Directly and indirectly, 
professionalism and communities of expertise have been undermined (Newfield 2008, pp. 257-63).  
 
But such observations also expose the difficulties in defending a liberal education. A liberal 
education is, at least in part, intended to produce a liberal outlook, including deference to 
appropriate expertise. In Turkey, old-line republican critics of the present education system often 
invoke the ideal of the early Turkish Republic to overcome tradition in order to produce a modern 
generation, understood in liberal terms contrasted to conservative religiosity (e.g. Koç 2006). To 
conservatives, all this awakens suspicions of liberals using state power in futile attempts to remake 
human nature. Not everyone approaches education from a hardened liberal or conservative point 
of view. But merely reasserting ambitions to mold students into liberal citizens need not appeal to 
the uncommitted. 
 
An emphasis on science might be more attractive, since science still has a reputation of being 
practical and nonpolitical. Few would object to science literacy as an object of education—science 
literacy should be useful. Moreover, scientific literacy is part of a more general cultural literacy. 
Even today’s popular culture, no less than high culture, includes references to ideas such as 
evolution. It would be to the advantage of students to understand such references, even if they 
personally reject evolution as an explanation for the history of life. 
 
Perhaps. But it is not entirely clear what “science literacy” means, and scientists and educators 
have a history of expecting too much in this regard. Modern science depends on broad conceptual 
frameworks such as relativity, quantum mechanics, or Darwinian evolution. Learning natural 
science, it would seem, requires students to engage with such conceptual frameworks. Otherwise, 
students end up collecting a set of “scientific facts” like stamps, not developing a picture of the 
world that is truly informed by science. Nonetheless, that is usually what happens. The conceptual 
frameworks that inform modern science are difficult to appreciate: they are counterintuitive and 
often require considerable intellectual maturity, not to mention some mathematical background, to 
grasp. In contrast to more everyday and religious ways of thinking, science demands profoundly 
unnatural ways of thought (McCauley 2011). Therefore, if scientific literacy requires an 
understanding of science that goes beyond collecting facts, it is very difficult to achieve beyond a 
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small percentage of the population that has a professional involvement in science or technology 
(Shamos 1995).  
 
Popular conceptions of evolution, even among populations that do not share a conservative 
religious suspicion of evolution, reflect such difficulties. As biologists have long observed (e.g. 
Gould 1989), evolution is popularly imagined to be progressive, with an inherent direction. Such 
conceptions also support a description of evolution as a purposeful, divinely guided process. And 
so the Intelligent Design version of creationism, for example, can position itself as a reasonable 
point of view that accepts much of evolution, especially if it is presented as an explanation for the 
origin of life or the sources of biological information (Meyer 2009). A theologian can claim that 
Islam has no difficulty with evolution, but defend a version of guided evolution that sidelines blind 
Darwinian mechanisms, and also assert that evolution applies to mere animals, not humans (Ateş 
1991). Grasping how biologists understand evolution does little for cultural literacy, since broader 
cultural notions of evolution are shaped in large part by concerns that have little to do with science.  
 
It is perhaps more realistic, given resource constraints, to expect mass science education to foster 
an appreciation of science rather than any robust science literacy (Shamos 1995). But this mainly 
restates the liberal hope that education will produce trust in proper expertise. Constituencies that 
are not committed to liberal views of expertise need more to be persuaded that mass instruction in 
evolution is to their advantage. 
 
What, then, does a student gain from being subjected to science education? In the United States 
and Turkey today, education is often considered an instrument for individual economic 
advancement. Education is an investment in human capital, in anticipation of future earnings. There 
is considerable pressure from the business community to reform education, by privatizing, 
imposing accountability in the form of standardized testing, and becoming more efficient with 
fewer resources. But reformers never call for less science and mathematics. After all, students will 
be going into a complex, technology-driven economy. Some competence in science, then, becomes 
important in order to achieve a decent economic position. Providing an inadequate background in 
central scientific concepts like evolution would impose a handicap on students. 
 
MARBURG JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2020) 17 
Even if such an argument has some plausibility, however, it need not support evolution as a vital 
component of mass science education. Knowing something about evolution might be relevant if 
there is a large demand for basic science skills in the labor market. This is not the case. 
 
The trajectory of the United States for the last three decades has been toward a low wage service 
economy for the majority of the population. Even a college degree is increasingly unnecessary for 
the jobs Americans actually occupy; the tendency is toward precarious employment and service 
jobs, the majority of which demands little education that is related to science or technology 
(Kalleberg 2011). In STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) fields, which are 
often described as keys to economic competitiveness, even though the United States is lagging in 
comparison with East Asian countries, there are signs that there is a strong overproduction of 
STEM graduates compared to the jobs available (Brown, Lauder, and Ashton 2011, chapter 3). 
 
Both liberals and conservatives in the United States have acquiesced in the offshoring of not just 
routine manufacturing but highly skilled technological jobs. And for decades, liberal celebration 
of “symbolic analysis” work (e.g. Reich 1992) has led to an emphasis on education as a panacea. 
In practice, rhetorical support for education has been a way to shift responsibility to individuals to 
cope with a neoliberal economy that offshores analytic jobs as easily as shop-floor manufacturing 
employment (Brown, Lauder, and Ashton 2011). Mass science education, with or without 
evolution, is not as relevant to the economic future of the United States as is often assumed. 
 
Turkey, as a middle-income country that is rarely at the cutting edge of developing technologies, 
faces different demands. Manufacturing industries have become stronger in Turkey, benefiting 
from offshoring from Europe and exploiting cheap labor and suppressed unions. Like many 
developing nations, Turkey has emphasized applied science and engineering; indeed, engineering 
fields have typically enjoyed greater social prestige than basic science, which provides few career 
opportunities aside from teaching. The engineering opportunities that exist do not concern cutting 
edge innovation; as in most countries, the bulk of engineering work is in unglamorous areas such 
as maintenance (Edgerton 2007). In any case, knowledge of evolution has next to no relevance to 
economic life. It is hard to see, in these circumstances, how creationism in Turkish schools can 
have any adverse effect on either individual economic prospects or national performance. 
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In that case, why is there agreement—including among creationists and business-class 
conservatives—that science education is a good thing? In part this is because science education 
still provides a vital service. Some conservative critics of public education point out that investment 
in education is rarely directly justifiable in market terms. Instead, while education may not impart 
skills, educational credentials signal the presence of desirable characteristics (Caplan 2018). 
Science education may well partly function in a similar manner: it acts as an intelligence test. A 
student who does well with science signals to prospective employers that she has developed some 
capabilities to handle abstract, often mathematical model-based ways of thinking. These are 
marketable skills in a complex economy. But while science education performs some of this 
training and selecting admirably, it is not the only means to achieve the same goals. Today, training 
in dead languages, classical literature, or Quranic interpretation might no longer provide a good 
enough demonstration of relevant skills through mastery of a useless subject.  
 
A full coverage of important science is not the only way to add an element of quantitative reasoning 
to a demonstration of academic discipline. In Turkey, some notable religious communities have 
put emphasis on helping pious students achieve academic success. One of the best known has been 
the Gülen movement, an offshoot of the Nur movement, which is deeply involved with promoting 
creationism in Turkey (Edis 2007). Until their recent clash with the AKP and purge from power, 
Gülenists have also been famous for their schools, in and out of Turkey, where they emphasize 
skills relevant to upward mobility. This includes mathematics, and a thorough grounding in the 
routine facts and formulae of science. Their students have performed well in standardized tests. 
The Gülenist experience suggests that if doing well on tests, economic success, and an ability to 
negotiate a world shaped by information technologies is the object, mass education in evolution is 
not relevant (Edis 2016). 
 
Focusing on the linkage between science and technology is, in fact, not a very promising way to 
defend evolution in science education. To a scientist, an idea like evolution is indispensable 
because of its intellectual power—how it helps everything in biology make sense. But the 
conservative approval of technology comes with a tendency to disaggregate the concepts of science 
and subordinate them to the practical purposes of technology. Learning about chemical reactions 
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or electrical phenomena is not, in this context, similar to learning about evolution or the climate. 
All of these are important for understanding the universe, and a deepening perspective on science 
also reveals fascinating connections between all scientific ideas. But if mass education is driven by 
technology-centered needs, what is scientifically vital can become practically irrelevant. 
 
It is then perhaps unsurprising that communities engaged in natural and applied science have 
distinct internal subcultures. Applied scientists—engineers and medical doctors, contrasted with 
physicists and biologists—are statistically much more likely to be politically and religiously 
conservative (Gambetta and Hertog 2007). And a political environment that emphasizes the 
economic benefits of applied science is not necessarily also supportive of research and education 
in the basic natural sciences. Increasing pressure to secure corporate funding also channels research 
efforts in a short-term applied direction. In the United States, many scientists today worry about an 
environment that demands immediate practical applications, where funding is less likely to be 
forthcoming for economically apparently useless areas such as astrophysics or the physics of 
fundamental particles and forces (Scheie 2012). In Turkey, there has been comparatively little 
opportunity to engage in basic science to begin with, so scientists are at least spared worries about 
further budget cuts. 
 
Such a climate is not good for the teaching of evolution, as it is hard to point to immediate practical 
applications of evolutionary biology. There has been some recent interest in Darwinian medicine, 
where an evolutionary perspective provides insight into disease processes and aspects of human 
physiology (Stearns and Koella 2008; Gluckman, Beedle, and Hanson 2009). And yet, as advocates 
of Darwinian medicine themselves point out, evolution is virtually ignored in medical education, 
even though at the same time some medical institutions have been quick to incorporate 
scientifically dubious emphases on religion (Sloan 2006). At best, evolutionary thinking has not 
yet demonstrated its full promise in medicine; it certainly cannot provide a rationale for a mass 
introduction to evolutionary biology. 
 
If all this is correct, the prospects for evolution education in Turkey and the United States are 
uncertain. Political arguments for teaching evolution are weak. Public science education in its 
present form bears the marks of a past when a liberal conception of expertise was politically much 
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stronger. In the past decades, conservatives have dismantled a liberal legacy in many aspects of 
public life. Science education may well follow. 
 
There may, however, be a more limited argument for evolution education that has better prospects. 
There is one area today which is at the cutting edge of science, has an applied orientation that 
promises many opportunities for commercial exploitation, and draws suspicion, even opposition, 
from religious conservatives. This is biotechnology. Reproductive technologies, stem cell research, 
and cloning already draw condemnations from a conservative bioethical perspective. Manipulating 
life at a fundamental level threatens common conservative monotheistic views regarding the 
integrity and created moral purpose inherent in human biological nature. Moreover, the possible 
applications of new biological knowledge may compete with the supernatural compensators 
religions provide (Bainbridge 2007). 
 
This is not to say that research in biotechnology is directly informed by evolutionary biology. The 
connection with evolution comes through the fact that religious conservatives cool toward 
evolution also usually think that biotechnological research should be restricted. The cutting-edge 
science immediately relevant to biotechnology is not best suited for secondary schools. But if a 
state or locality teaches evolution with little public controversy, this signals an environment that is 
more receptive to biotechnological research and hospitable toward biotech companies. Whether it 
also indicates a more general favorable disposition toward science is immaterial. High technology 
can coexist with scientifically dubious ideas; Silicon Valley, for example, is notoriously a locality 
where New Age flavors of pseudoscience flourish. Acceptance of evolution specifically signals a 
cultural environment that lacks the conservative religious resistance toward biotechnological 
ambitions. 
 
So there is at least one limited context in which evolution education can indirectly serve business 
interests. Such examples cannot sustain an argument for the presence of evolution in mass 
education at nationwide scales. But even countries where religious conservatism is influential, such 
as Turkey and the United States, include religiously more liberal populations. The conservative 
tendency to defer to local standards and to privilege markets also provides opportunities for more 
liberal communities to conduct education their own way. By teaching evolution, they will signal 
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their religious liberalism and comparative secularity, which will attract and repel a different mix 
of business enterprises compared to communities that signal their traditional religiosity. 
 
Business as usual 
 
This analysis assumes continuing business dominance of politics in the United States and Turkey, 
and religious conservatives’ continuing ability to exploit the consequent loss of power of 
communities of expertise institutionally dependent on a liberal state. This assumption seems safe. 
But it may also be worthwhile to speculate on the condition of the scientific community, even if it 
can no longer control science education. 
 
If the United States follows the Turkish lead in degrading the presence of evolution in education, 
American science will suffer, but not greatly. The scientific community is based in higher education 
plus corporate and government laboratories. These are somewhat isolated from secondary 
education. If applied science receives even further emphasis, this will only be a reversion to the 
historical norm. Before World War Two, the reputation of American science was that while it was 
strong in applications, it was weak in theoretical and conceptual development. And even after 
American science took over a position of global leadership, support for science depended on the 
services it provided for military and commercial ends. The immediate future prospects for science 
may include some loss of status and autonomy due to the weakening of liberal institutions and a 
tighter focus on military and commercial needs. But this is not a radical change: American science 
will continue, regardless of the state of public science education. This includes research in 
evolutionary biology. Very few people ever do natural science; it will be enough for a few to 
become curious and learn what they need in their higher education even if secondary science 
education deteriorates. 
 
Turkey already emphasizes applied science and engineering, and treats basic science as a luxury. 
Setting aside evolutionary biology, Muslim countries in general already contribute very little to 
basic science in areas such as physics (Hoodbhoy 2007). Turkey’s efforts to improve its position 
in the modern world depend on applied science. This may mean a lag in absorbing technologies 
based on the latest in condensed matter physics or stem cell research. But even that should not be 
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exaggerated. In a global economy, no country can long monopolize commercial advantages due to 
any area of research. 
 
Nonetheless, a scientific enterprise more distant to education and more focused on immediate 
applications would also be a diminished, truncated form of science. Subservience to market values 
and acting as a support system for applied research is far from what motivates scientists. Science 
is certainly not cheap, and so the resources devoted to science need some political justification. But 
at their best, scientific institutions deliver more than a basis for fancier gadgets and more powerful 
bombs. They also allow scientists to act on values and motivations that are internal to science. 
Scientists care deeply about this intellectual freedom. 
 
In that case, defenders of science and science education must move away from a narrow 
pragmatism. There are many disciplines within science that may appear of questionable immediate 
use, from astrophysics to paleontology. In this regard, they are in a situation similar to the arts and 
humanities. They are valuable primarily to constituencies that appreciate them on their own terms, 
due to the intellectual excitement that they generate and reproduce in new generations of students. 
Expertise, in such a context, can more easily be seen as something earned rather than derived from 
a privileged position within liberal institutions. But a business dominated culture that tends to 
conceive of art or philosophy as private indulgences will very likely put evolutionary biology or 
general relativity in the same position.  
 
And in the end, all sciences have some practical significance, perhaps because they do represent 
our best collective effort to figure out how nature works. Political rejection of the physics of global 
warming, even more than the constant religious opposition to evolution, illustrates that ideological 
opposition to scientific ideas invites dire consequences. But the same example also illustrates the 
difficulty in achieving a successful political argument for accepting scientific expertise. After all, 
it appears industrial civilization is committed to business as usual—the political obstacles to even 
inadequate changes in course have proven insurmountable. In such circumstances, when politics 
cannot even respond to probable catastrophe, it is hard to expect that the prospects for evolution 
education are very good. 
 




Thanks are due to Eugenie Scott and Joshua Rosenau for comments and discussions. 
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